2,414 research outputs found

    Outcome contingency selectively affects the neural coding of outcomes but not of tasks

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    Value-based decision-making is ubiquitous in every-day life, and critically depends on the contingency between choices and their outcomes. Only if outcomes are contingent on our choices can we make meaningful value-based decisions. Here, we investigate the effect of outcome contingency on the neural coding of rewards and tasks. Participants performed a reversal-learning paradigm in which reward outcomes were contingent on trial-by-trial choices, and performed a ‘free choice’ paradigm in which rewards were random and not contingent on choices. We hypothesized that contingent outcomes enhance the neural coding of rewards and tasks, which was tested using multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data. Reward outcomes were encoded in a large network including the striatum, dmPFC and parietal cortex, and these representations were indeed amplified for contingent rewards. Tasks were encoded in the dmPFC at the time of decision-making, and in parietal cortex in a subsequent maintenance phase. We found no evidence for contingency-dependent modulations of task signals, demonstrating highly similar coding across contingency conditions. Our findings suggest selective effects of contingency on reward coding only, and further highlight the role of dmPFC and parietal cortex in value-based decision-making, as these were the only regions strongly involved in both reward and task coding

    Context-dependence and context-invariance in the neural coding of intentional action

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    Maintaining intentions over time is fundamental to goal-directed action, and previous research demonstrated that intentions are encoded and maintained in a fronto-parietal network including e.g., the dlPFC and IPS. Yet, intention maintenance is highly challenging in the constantly changing environments we experience every day. While we might have formed an intention under specific conditions, this context can change rapidly and unexpectedly. Some suggested that intentions representations in the fronto-parietal cortex change flexibly when external demands change (context-dependent coding). Others suggested that these representations are encoded in an abstract format that is not affected by changes in external demands (context-invariant coding). Here, I will first outline an analysis approach using multivariate pattern analysis of fMRI data to comprehensively assess the context-dependence / invariance of intention representations in the fronto-parietal cortex. I will then highlight some research following the proposed analysis strategy. Results to date are mixed, showing context-dependence in some, but context-invariance in other cases. In an attempt to synthesize these somewhat divergent results, I will argue that depending on characteristics of the intentions as well as the environment, intentions can either be encoded in a context-dependent or a context-invariant format. This enables us to achieve both stability and flexibility of behavior under constantly changing external demands

    Frontoparietal action-oriented codes support novel task set implementation

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    A key aspect of human cognitive flexibility concerns the ability to rapidly convert complex symbolic instructions into novel behaviors. Previous research proposes that this fast configuration is supported by two differentiated neurocognitive states, namely, an initial declarative maintenance of task knowledge, and a progressive transformation into a pragmatic, action-oriented state necessary for optimal task execution. Furthermore, current models predict a crucial role of frontal and parietal brain regions in this transformation. However, direct evidence for such frontoparietal formatting of novel task representations is still lacking. Here, we report the results of an fMRI experiment in which participants had to execute novel instructed stimulus-response associations. We then used a multivariate pattern-tracking procedure to quantify the degree of neural activation of instructions in declarative and procedural representational formats. This analysis revealed, for the first time, format-unique representations of relevant task sets in frontoparietal areas, prior to execution. Critically, the degree of procedural (but not declarative) activation predicted subsequent behavioral performance. Our results shed light on current debates on the architecture of cognitive control and working memory systems, suggesting a contribution of frontoparietal regions to output gating mechanisms that drive behavior

    Residential Mortgages Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Increasing Case Against Cramdown After Dewsnup v. Timm

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    Congress designed Chapter 13 to allow individuals an extended period of time to pay their debts so that they may support themselves and their dependents while repaying their creditors. Chapter 13 bankruptcy is more favorable to debtors than a straight liquidation under Chapter 7 because Chapter 13 debtors may keep all of their assets while Chapter 7 debtors must surrender most of their assets to generate funds with which to pay their creditors. A Chapter 13 debtor also benefits by avoiding the stigma and less favorable credit rating that accompanies a liquidating bankruptcy.s Chapter 13\u27s benefit to creditors is also self- evident: their losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy. An emerging trend to interpret the Bankruptcy Code (the Code ) as prohibiting cramdown of residential mortgages threatens Chapter 13\u27s mission.\u27 The term cramdown refers generally to any attempt by a debtor to pay a secured creditor less than the full amount of its claim. For example, suppose a debtor previously borrowed 100,000topurchaseahomevaluedat100,000 to purchase a home valued at 150,000. Assume further that the fair market value of that home falls to 60,000whiletheamountofthedebtremains60,000 while the amount of the debt remains 100,000. The creditor now lacks security for the full amount of his loan. Cramdown allows the debtor to discharge the debt and retain the collateral by paying only the fair market value of the collateral plus a fraction of the difference between the amount of the debt and the value of the collateral. In our example, the debtor may keep his home, free of any liens or encumbrances, by paying 60,000plusafraction,perhapsaslittleastenpercent,of60,000 plus a fraction, perhaps as little as ten percent, of 40,000. Thus, the debtor might discharge a debt of 100,000,securedbyahomethatwasonceworth100,000, secured by a home that was once worth 150,000, by paying the creditor as little as $64,000. Cramdown\u27s value to debtors lies in the fact that they do not have to pay their debts in full, but instead may treat the liens on their homes as unsecured claims to the extent that the liens exceed the value of the collateral. Chapter 13 requires debtors to pay unsecured creditors only what they would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation case.12 This may be nothing at all, and is often as little as five or ten cents on the dollar.\u27 Whether the Code permits cramdown of residential mortgages under Chapter 13 is an important question. Debtors choose to file under Chapter 13 principally to keep their homes.\u27 If cramdown is found unavailable then debtors may be less likely to choose Chapter 13 rather than Chapter 7 with the ultimate result that Chapter 13\u27s mission is left unaccomplished

    Shared neural representations of cognitive conflict and negative affect in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex

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    Influential theories of dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) function suggest that the dACC registers cognitive conflict as an aversive signal, but no study directly tested this idea. In this pre-registered human fMRI study, we used multivariate pattern analyses to identify which regions respond similarly to conflict and aversive signals. The results show that, of all conflict- and value-related regions, only the dACC/pre-SMA showed shared representations, directly supporting recent dACC theories

    Relating free will beliefs and attitudes

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    D.W. was supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie (MSCA) grant agreement no. 665501 and the Flemish Science Foundation (FWO) grant FWO.KAN.2019.0023.01. E.C. was supported by FWO grants FWO18/PDO/049 and 12U0322N. C.G.-G. was supported by MSCA grant no. 835767 and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation grant IJC2019-040208-I. M.B. was supported by the Einstein Foundation Berlin (Einstein Strategic Professorship). ReferencesMost people believe in free will, which is foundational for our sense of agency and responsibility. Past research demonstrated that such beliefs are dynamic, and can be manipulated experimentally. Much less is known about free will attitudes (FWAs; do you value free will?), whether they are equally dynamic, and about their relation to free will beliefs (FWBs). If FWAs were strongly positive, people might be reluctant to revise their beliefs even in the face of strong evidence to do so. In this registered report, we developed a novel measure of FWAs and directly related FWBs and attitudes for the first time. We found FWBs and attitudes to be positively related, although to a lesser degree than determinism or dualism beliefs/attitudes. Nevertheless, an experimental manipulation technique aimed at reducing FWBs (Crick text) showed remarkably specific effects on FWBs only, and no effects on FWAs. Overall, these results provide valuable new insights into laypeople’s views on free will by including a novel measure of FWAs. They also provide evidence for the validity of a common experimental technique that has been rightfully criticized in the literature lately.European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie (MSCA) 665501FWO FWO.KAN.2019.0023.01 FWO18/PDO/049 12U0322N MSCA 835767Spanish Government IJC2019-040208-IEinstein Foundation Berlin (Einstein Strategic Professorship

    How exerting control over outcomes affects the neural coding of tasks and outcomes

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    Humans make choices every day, which are often intended to lead to desirable outcomes. While we often have some degree of control over the outcomes of our actions, in many cases this control remains limited. Here, we investigate the effect of control over outcomes on the neural correlates of outcome valuation and implementation of behavior, as desired outcomes can only be reached if choices are implemented as intended. In a value-based decision-making task, reward outcomes were either contingent on trial-by-trial choices between two different tasks, or were unrelated to these choices. Using fMRI, multivariate pattern analysis, and model-based neuroscience methods, we identified reward representations in a large network including the striatum, dorso-medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and parietal cortex. These representations were amplified when rewards were contingent on subjects’ choices. We further assessed the implementation of chosen tasks by identifying brain regions encoding tasks during a preparation or maintenance phase, and found them to be encoded in the dmPFC and parietal cortex. Importantly, outcome contingency did not affect neural coding of chosen tasks. This suggests that controlling choice outcomes selectively affects the neural coding of these outcomes, but has no effect on the means to reach them. Overall, our findings highlight the role of the dmPFC and parietal cortex in processing of value-related and task-related information, linking motivational and control-related processes in the brain. These findings inform current debates on the neural basis of motivational and cognitive control, as well as their interaction

    Drug-Induced Plasticity Contributing to Heightened Relapse Susceptibility: Neurochemical Changes and Augmented Reinstatement in High-Intake Rats

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    A key in understanding the neurobiology of addiction and developing effective pharmacotherapies is revealing drug-induced plasticity that results in heightened relapse susceptibility. Previous studies have demonstrated that increased extracellular glutamate, but not dopamine, in the nucleus accumbens core (NAcc) is necessary for cocaine-induced reinstatement. In this report, we examined whether drug-induced adaptations that are necessary to generate cocaine-induced reinstatement also determine relapse vulnerability. To do this, rats were assigned to self-administer cocaine under conditions resulting in low (2 h/d; 0.5 mg/kg/infusion, i.v.) or high (6 h/d; 1.0 mg/kg/infusion, i.v.) levels of drug intake since these manipulations produce groups of rats exhibiting differences in the magnitude of cocaine-induced reinstatement. Approximately 19 d after the last session, cocaine-induced drug seeking and extracellular levels of glutamate and dopamine in the NAcc were measured. Contrary to our hypothesis, high-intake rats exhibited a more robust cocaine-induced increase in extracellular levels of dopamine but not glutamate. Further, increased reinstatement in high-intake rats was no longer observed when the D1 receptor antagonist SCH-23390 was infused into the NAcc. The sensitized dopamine response to cocaine in high-intake rats may involve blunted cystine–glutamate exchange by system xc−. Reduced 14C-cystine uptake through system xc− was evident in NAcc tissue slices obtained from high-intake rats, and the augmented dopamine response in these rats was no longer observed when subjects received the cysteine prodrug N-acetyl cysteine. These data reveal a role for drug-induced NAcc dopamine in heightened relapse vulnerability observed in rats with a history of high levels of drug intake

    Free will beliefs are better predicted by dualism than determinism beliefs across different cultures

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    Most people believe in free will. Whether this belief is warranted or not, free will beliefs (FWB) are foundational for many legal systems and reducing FWB has effects on behavior from the motor to the social level. This raises the important question as to which specific FWB people hold. There are many different ways to conceptualize free will, and some might see physical determinism as a threat that might reduce FWB, while others might not. Here, we investigate lay FWB in a large, representative, replicated online survey study in the US and Singapore (n = 1800), assessing differences in FWB with unprecedented depth within and between cultures. Specifically, we assess the relation of FWB, as measured using the Free Will Inventory, to determinism, dualism and related concepts like libertarianism and compatibilism. We find that libertarian, compatibilist, and dualist, intuitions were related to FWB, but that these intuitions were often logically inconsistent. Importantly, direct comparisons suggest that dualism was more predictive of FWB than other intuitions. Thus, believing in free will goes hand-in-hand with a belief in a non-physical mind. Highlighting the importance of dualism for FWB impacts academic debates on free will, which currently largely focus on its relation to determinism. Our findings also shed light on how recent (neuro)scientific findings might impact FWB. Demonstrating physical determinism in the brain need not have a strong impact on FWB, due to a wide-spread belief in dualism

    An examination of refreshing in between-category sequences

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    The present study focused on refreshing within a working memory (WM) context. Refreshing refers to the mechanism that brings back information into the focus of attention in order to counteract forgetting of memory traces. Despite some research on this topic, the exact nature of refreshing remains unclear. The present study investigated refreshing by means of the cognitive load (CL) effect. This effect is typically observed in complex span tasks, which combine processing and storage demands. It refers to the observation that WM performance depends on the CL of concurrent processing, defined as the proportion of time between list items that is occupied by concurrent processing and therefore not available to refresh memory items. Traditionally, the CL effect has been demonstrated using within-category memory sequences in which all memory items are drawn from one category (e.g., all words). Here, we show that the CL effect also applies to between-category memory sequences in which memory items are drawn from different categories (e.g., words, orientations, faces, etc.). The ensemble of the results adds to the domain-generality of the CL effect. Implications concerning the specific nature of refreshing and future research directions are discussed
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